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11 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) in renewable energy resources as alternatives to fossil fuels is one
of approaches to tackle the climate change. How to induce the R&D towards those technologies
which would signiﬁcantly reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions becomes one of the most
pressing policy challenges facing the world today. Most of related empirical analysis in the en-
vironmental economics literature are either built upon computational general equilibrium models
(Nordhaus, 1994), or assume exogenous technological improvement (Golosov et al. 2009), hence
ignore the response of endogenous technical innovation to the environmental and/or related trade
policies. Additionally, their theoretical frameworks based upon representative ﬁrm models are ab-
sence of the feature of ﬁrm’s heterogeneity in terms of productivity, and do not characterize the
stylized fact of ﬁrm’s entry-exit decisions. However, these two features play substantial roles in ex-
plaining the ﬁrm-level economic activities from both theoretical and empirical international trade
model (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007; Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2007; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; etc).
A satisfactory framework for evaluating diﬀerent environmental proposals and related trade
policies must include at its centerpiece the endogenous response of technical improvement to pro-
posed policies in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms. We adapt and extend the basic framework
of heterogeneous ﬁrm and endogenous innovation activities developed in Atkeson and Burstein
(2010) into a two-sector model with environmental performance. Two sectors are labeled as dirty
and clean according to its sector-speciﬁc pollution intensity. Each produces a non-tradeable ﬁnal
good by combing a continuum of either domestically produced or exported intermediate inputs in
that sector. Within each sector, intermediate ﬁrms with ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity bears four types
of costs, i.e. ﬁxed entry costs, ﬁxed operation costs, exporting costs including ﬁxed and variable
parts, and innovation costs. Upon observing these costs and productivity draws, they make deci-
sions of entry, exit, production, export, and innovation. The innovation decision is modeled as an
investment in improving the ﬁrm’s productivity draw by choosing probabilities of success. These
ﬁxed cost structures together with the heterogeneous productivity determine that a continuum of
heterogeneous intermediate ﬁrms is partitioned by the market status.
We perform simple numerical simulations concerning the implication of a stringent environ-
2mental policy and a proposal of trade cost diﬀerences on dirty and clean inputs. Our objective is
to highlight the eﬀects of these proposals on the technological innovation, trade pattern, and ﬁrm
dynamics. We ﬁnd that a symmetric reduction in emission permit cap raises the mass of entering
ﬁrms in the clean sector, but lower the mass of entering ﬁrms in the dirty sector. There exists
resource reallocation between sectors, the aggregate productivity across all domestic and exporting
ﬁrms within the dirty sector drops, but that index within the clean sector rises. The proposal of
trade variable costs diﬀerences on dirty and clean inputs has substantial impact on the technological
innovation across sector. A relatively lower trade variable cost on the clean inputs contributes to
investing in R&D activities for all clean ﬁrms, especially for those productive ones; On the contrary,
a relatively higher trade variable cost on the dirty inputs discourages the dirty ﬁrms to engage in
the technological innovation.
Our paper relates to the growing literature on growth, trade, and the environment. The pio-
neering study by Nordhaus (1994) introduces a dynamic integrated model of climate change and
the economy, called the DICE model. Another branch of the literature focusing on the normative
analysis includes a recent work by Golosov et al. (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2011). The former
studies the optimal policies in a model with exogenous technology and exhaustible resources, and
it shows that the optimal resource tax should decrease over time. The latter one is built upon
a growth model with endogenous and directed technical change. The innovation is directed by a
group of scientist instead of ﬁrms themselves, hence it has the "state dependence" feature in the
sense that advances in one sector make future advances in that sector more proﬁtable or more ef-
fective. Their optimal policies involve a combination of a carbon tax, a subsidy to clean innovation
and a subsidy for the use of all machines.
To my knowledge, there is a limited work applying the heterogeneous ﬁrms framework into
the environmental economics. Li and Shi (2010) adapts and extends the closed economy model
setup in the Melitz framework into environmental economics. They look into the eﬃciency assess-
ment of alternative environmental policies between standard and tax, and ﬁnd that productivity
heterogeneity plays an important role in assessing the policies. Cui (2011) incorporates clean tech-
nology adoption and environmental performance into the Melitz framework. His study focuses on
the implication of trade liberalization and stringent environmental policy on the exogenous clean
technology adoption, and ﬁrm dynamics.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the extended model
setup, followed up by a characterization of simulated symmetric steady-state equilibrium in next
section. Section 4 provides numerical results on stringent environmental policy and trade cost
diﬀerences. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
The basic model setup is developed in Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and we extend it into a
two-sector model in the presence of environmental activities.
2.1 Preference
An inﬁnite-horizon discrete-time economy is inhabited by a representative consumer performing
roles of a worker and entrepreneur. The representative consumer with an inﬁnite life has preference
over the composite consumption of non-tradable ﬁnal goods, denoted by Ct, and values the quality




(1 + λ)t [U(Ct) − D(St)] (1)
where λ ∈ (0,1) is the discount rate. The separability of the per-period utility function allows the
consumption to be exempt from the pollution externality. The damage function D(St) is increasing
and convex in the quality of the environment, St. At time t, the consumption of non-tradable ﬁnal
goods is composed of one ﬁnal good produced in the dirty sector, called dirty good, indexed by













where ε ∈ (1,∞) denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two ﬁnal outputs.
2.2 Production
At time t, a non-tradable ﬁnal good j ∈ {c,d}, index clean and dirty respectively, is produced by
a continuum of tradable intermediate goods in sector j. Intermediate good ﬁrms in each country
4are monopolistically competitive. Intermediate goods are each produced by heterogeneous ﬁrms
indexed by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity ϕ, which represents the quality of the intermediate good
as well. Production of intermediate goods requires labor used as both ﬁxed and variable costs.
Let fj > 0 be the time-invariant ﬁxed production cost of serving domestic market, measured
in labor units thereafter sunk. In addition, the production of intermediate goods also generates
pollution byproducts. Following the technique by Copeland and Taylor (1995), we treat the emission
byproduct as another input used in the production. Hence, an intermediate good ﬁrm with the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity ϕ in sector j at time t, produces intermediate output yjt(ϕ) according to
the constant returns to scale production technology,
yjt(ϕ) = ϕ1/(ρ−1)(ljt)1−βj(ejt)βj (3)
where ljt is the units of labor used as variable costs; ejt is the amount of pollution byproducts
generated by the intermediate good of type ϕ; βj denotes the time-invariant sector-speciﬁc emission
intensity in sector j. For expositional convenience, we rescale ﬁrm productivity using the exponent
1/(ρ − 1) such that each ﬁrm’s equilibrium revenues and variable proﬁts are proportional to ϕ,
where ρ > 1.
International trade is subject to both time-invariant ﬁxed costs of fx
j > 0 measured in labor
thereafter sunk, and iceberg type of variable costs, denoted by τj > 1. Let xjt(ϕ) ∈ {0,1} be an
indicator of the export decision of home intermediate ﬁrms with ϕ in sector j at time t (with xjt(ϕ) =
1 if the ﬁrm exports and 0 otherwise). We use an asterisk to distinguish foreign variables from the
home ones when necessary, the corresponding foreign equations could be deﬁned analogously.
The output of a home country intermediate good ﬁrm can be used to produce the home ﬁnal
good, with the quantity of this domestic absorption denoted by ajt(ϕ). Alternatively, some portion
of its output could be exported to produce the foreign ﬁnal good. The quantity of the output of the
home intermediate ﬁrm used in the foreign country is denoted as ax
jt(ϕ). Since export is subject to
variable costs of τj > 1, the home intermediate ﬁrm must export τjax
jt(ϕ) units of output in order
to have ax
jt(ϕ) units arrive in the foreign country for uses in the production of the foreign ﬁnal good
5j. Then, feasibility condition requires that,
ajt(ϕ) + xjt(ϕ)τjax
jt(ϕ) = yjt(ϕ) (4)
Thus, a non-tradable ﬁnal good in sector j is produced by assembling a continuum of home












jt) denote the measures of the home and foreign intermediate ﬁrms in sector j at
time t, respectively; ax∗
jt (ϕ) denotes the units of the foreign intermediate goods which are exported
and used for producing the home ﬁnal good in sector; x∗
jt(ϕ) is the export decision of the foreign
intermediate ﬁrms. Intermediate goods are substitute with a constant elasticity of ρ > 1. Note
that the ﬁrst integration represents the home intermediate goods used in the domestic market, the
second one expresses the foreign intermediate goods used in the export market. The production
function form of non-tradeable ﬁnal goods also captures the importance of both the quality and
quantity of intermediate goods utilized in the production.
The non-tradeable ﬁnal goods in both home and foreign countries are produced by competitive
ﬁrms which choose output Yjt and inputs ajt(ϕ) and ax∗
jt (ϕ) subject to (5), to maximize proﬁts
given prices of the ﬁnal good and intermediate goods Pjt, pjt, px∗
jt ; export decisions xjt(ϕ), x∗
jt(ϕ);









































6A home intermediate ﬁrm with a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity draw ϕ faces a static proﬁt max-
imization problem of choosing labor inputs ljt(ϕ), emission inputs ejt(ϕ), prices pjt(ϕ),px
jt(ϕ),
quantities ajt(ϕ),ax
jt(ϕ), and export decision xjt(ϕ), in order to maximize current period proﬁts
given the wage rate wt, emission price pet, prices and outputs of the ﬁnal good j in both countries
Pjt,P∗
jt,Yjt and Y ∗



















where σ ≡ 1 − 1/ρ ∈ (0,1), given ρ > 1; cjt(pet,wt) denotes the marginal cost of the home
intermediate ﬁrm in sector j at time t. Due to the homogeneity of the production function (3), the
marginal cost is given by:
cjt(pet,wt) ≡ Bj(wt)1−βj(pet)βj (11)
where Bj ≡ β
−βj





















where ljt(ϕ) & lx
jt(ϕ) denote the variable labor input demand in the domestic and export market,
respectively; ejt(ϕ) & ex
jt(ϕ) are the emission permit input demand in the domestic and export
market, respectively.
Revenues earned from the domestic and export market, denoted by rjt(ϕ) and rx
jt(ϕ), respec-
tively, are proportional to ϕ,

















We apportion the entire ﬁxed production cost to the domestic market, the ﬁxed exporting cost
7to the export market. Hence, total proﬁts of a home intermediate ﬁrm in period t includes proﬁts













Thus, the equilibrium proﬁts of the intermediate ﬁrm with productivity ϕ, denoted by Πjt(ϕ),
can be written as,






The timing of the event is described as follows. At the beginning of each period t, in sector
j ∈ {c,d}, each intermediate good ﬁrm pays a time-invariant ﬁxed entrance fee of fe
j > 0 as an
initial investment to draw its ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity ϕ from a common distribution function g(ϕ)
with a positive support. g(ϕ) has a continuous cumulative distribution function of G(ϕ). Upon
observing the draw, the intermediate ﬁrm decides to operate a plant in that sector. If the ﬁrm
does decide to operate, it bears a ﬁxed production cost of fj > 0 to establish a plant and serve the
domestic market. Export requires an additional ﬁxed cost of fx
j > 0 and the standard iceberg form
of variable cost τj > 1. If the ﬁrm does produce, it also faces an exogenous probability δ ∈ (0,1)
of an idiosyncratic bad shock which forces it to exit. In the end of each period, the surviving ﬁrm
with a productivity draw ϕ could invest c(q)ϕ units of labor in R&D to improve its productivity.
The R&D would succeed and raise the productivity by ∆ϕ with a probability q, it fails and hence
suﬀer a productivity loss by the same amount otherwise. The ﬁrm’s choice of q is referred as the
process innovation in Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and the R&D expenditure of c(q) is increasing
and convex in q. A detailed function form will be speciﬁed in the later simulation section.
Let Vjt(ϕ) be the value of an intermediate ﬁrm with productivity ϕ in sector j at time t after
the realization of its productivity draw. Next period, the ﬁrm of type ϕ would survive with a
probability of 1 − δ. Then, its productivity would be upgraded to ϕ + ∆ϕ with a probability of q,
and be downgraded to ϕ − ∆ϕ otherwise. Given price sequences of z = {pet,wt}, the problem of
8an incumbent ﬁrm is deﬁned recursively by a Bellman function:
Vjt(ϕ,z) = max
n
Πjt(ϕ) − c(q)ϕ +
1 − δ
1 + λ
max{0,qVjt+1(ϕ + ∆ϕ,z) + (1 − q)Vjt+1(ϕ − ∆ϕ,z)}
o
(16)
In each period t and sector j, the decision of operating follows a cutoﬀ rule that ﬁrms with
productivity no less than a cutoﬀ of ˆ ϕjt choose to operate and ﬁrms with productivity below that
cutoﬀ exit. Note that if the ﬁxed production costs are assumed away, fj = 0, then there is no
endogenous entry and exit. Likewise for the export decision, given the static proﬁt maximization
problem, the export decisions are determined by the static condition that variable proﬁts from
exports must exceed ﬁxed costs of exporting, that is,
xjt(ϕ) = 1 iﬀ πx
jt(ϕ) ≥ 0 (17)
In any period when new ﬁrms enter sector j after paying an initial entrance fee of fe








where 1 + λ also is the world interest rate.
Denote Me
jt as the measure of potential new entrants of intermediate ﬁrms in sector j ∈ {c,d}
at time t. The measure of operating intermediate ﬁrms in the home country in period t + 1 with
state variable less than or equal to ϕ0, denoted by Mjt+1(ϕ0), is equal to the sum of three inﬂows of
ﬁrms: successful new entrants in period t; incumbents surviving from period t whose productivities
are upgraded; and incumbents surviving from period t whose productivities are downgraded. This
law of motion is written as follows:
For ϕ0 ≥ ˆ ϕ0
jt+1 (19)
Mjt+1(ϕ0) = Me
jt[G(ϕ0) − G(ˆ ϕ0
jt+1)] + (1 − δ)
Z ϕ0−∆ϕ
0





For ϕ0 < ˆ ϕ0
jt+1,Mjt+1(ϕ0) = 0
92.3 The Environment and Government
The quality of the environment in each country is being degraded by pollution emissions generated
during the production of home intermediate goods. For simplicity, the global impact of pollution
emissions is not accounted in the model. Hence St evolves according to the diﬀerence equation
St+1 = (1 + θ)St − Et (20)
where θ is the rate of "environmental regeneration", Et is the amount of pollution emitted from the
dirty sector.
Government in each country implements a time sequence of pollution tax {pet}, and would
irrevocably precommit to it. The alternative emission permit cap-and-trade program would be
also considered for policy comparison. Under this scenario, the government would set a time
path of permit cap {Et} instead. Intermediate ﬁrms must purchase the equivalent amounts of
permits to emit pollution. Permits are not allowed to trade across country, neither does the inter-
temporal trade. Revenues collected from auctioning emission permits would be transferred to the











Labor inputs used in production as variable and ﬁxed costs plus those sunk as initial entrance



















The aggregate revenue in the steady-state equilibrium equals the total payments to emission










= petEt + wtL (23)
102.4 Equilibrium




prices of emission permits {pet,p∗
et}, prices of intermediate good {pjt,px
jt,p∗
jt,px∗
jt }, a collection of
sequences of aggregate quantities {Ct,Cjt,Yjt,C∗
t ,C∗
jt,Y ∗










jt }, and a collection of sequences of ﬁrm value functions







and measures of operating and entering ﬁrms {Mjt,Me
jt,M∗
jt,Me∗
jt }, and quality of environment {St}
such that, in each period and each country:
(i) representative household maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint;
(ii) intermediate good ﬁrms maximize within-period proﬁts;
(iii) ﬁnal good ﬁrms maximize proﬁts;
(iv) labor and emission permit input markets clear, respectively, (21), (22);
(v) mass of operating ﬁrms and evolution of environmental quality are given by the law of motion,
respectively, (19), (20).
3 Simulation
In this section, we perform numerical simulations assuming the symmetric steady-state equilibrium
in which all of the variables are constant, and countries are symmetric. The transition dynamics
is omitted in the current stage. Our objective is to highlight the eﬀects of environmental policy
and related trade proposals on the technological innovation and ﬁrm dynamics in the steady-
state equilibrium. In general, parameters are chosen to make our exercises as similar to existing
quantitative analysis as possible, i.e. Acemoglu et al. (2011), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007), etc. Their numerical calibrations reproduce a number of salient features
of US data on ﬁrm dynamics, international trade, production of nonfossil and fossil fuel sectors,
and atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2).
113.1 Symmetric Steady-State Equilibrium
In our simulation analysis with a symmetric steady-state equilibrium, the export variable proﬁt is




j . Now assume that the ﬁrm’s exit, export
decisions and research decisions are given and the associated steady-state distributions per entering
ﬁrms across sectors ˜ Mjt(ϕ) ≡ Mjt(ϕ)/Me
jt are given. The time subscript is omitted. To solve for
the remaining aggregate variables, we ﬁrst deﬁne several measures of aggregate productivity. Let ˜ ϕd
j
be an index of productivity aggregated across all operating and non-exporting home intermediate
ﬁrms; and ˜ ϕx




[1 − xjt(ϕ)]ϕd ˜ Mjt; ˜ ϕx
jt ≡
Z
xjt(ϕ)ϕd ˜ Mjt (24)
Both indexes are scaled by the mass of entering ﬁrms. Hence, our ideal measure of aggregate
productivity in home country, ˜ ϕjt, is given by,










By symmetry, ˜ ϕjt also represents the aggregate productivity of all operating ﬁrms (domestic and
foreign) competing in home country (where the productivity of exporters is adjusted by the trade
cost τ). Put it diﬀerently, (˜ ϕdt, ˜ ϕct) correspond to the aggregate "dirty sector-speciﬁc technology"
index and "clean sector-speciﬁc technology" index, respectively.
From ﬁrm’s static proﬁt maximization problem, we have that the aggregate emission permit













Similarly, the aggregate variable labor inputs used in production of home intermediate ﬁrms in












12The average labor inputs per entering ﬁrms used as ﬁxed costs and R&D investments of home
intermediate ﬁrms in sector j, which we denote by l
f








d ˜ Mj + fe
j (28)
Thus, the aggregate labor inputs used as ﬁxed costs, indexed by L
f






For sector j ∈ {c,d}, given πv
j, ˜ ϕj, and l
f
j , the symmetric steady-state values of pe, w, R, Yj,
Cj, Pj, and Me
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R = peE + wL
3.2 Algorithm
The recursive algorithm using the Matlab code to look for the symmetric steady-state equilibrium
is similar to the algorithm used in Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and is described as follows.
First step, given permit price pe (wage rate is normalized to one), variable domestic proﬁt πv
j,
and mass of entering ﬁrms across sector Me
j as initial guesses, we ﬁrst pass the initial guesses of
πv
j into ﬁrm’s dynamic program problem for each sector using the value function iteration method.
We ﬁnd out the level of πv
j that is consistent with free entry condition, which in turn gives exit and
export decisions.
Then associated with πv
j are the ﬁrm’s policy functions which are used to ﬁnd the stationary
distribution of ﬁrms according to the law of motion. With these policy functions and stationary
distribution, the remaining aggregate variables could be written as functions of policy’s functions,
13stationary distribution, initial value of permit price, and mass of entering ﬁrms.
Finally, we use "fsolve" in Matlab to ﬁnd out the equilibrium values of pe, w, and Me
j such that
two ﬁnal goods market clearing, emission permit and labor market clearing conditions hold.
3.3 Parameters
Table 1 summarizes all of baseline parameters. In general, most parameters are drawn from Atkeson
and Burstein (2010), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) and Acemoglu et al.(2011). Both dirty
and clean sectors share the same values of ﬁxed production costs, entry costs and exporting costs,
all of which come from Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010), the
latter focuses on a two-sector general equilibrium model with comparative advantage. However,
sectors diﬀer only in pollution intensities. We take a value of βd = 0.6 for pollution intensity in the
dirty sector, of βc = 0 in the clean sector assuming the absolutely clean sector for simplicity. The
exogenous exit rate of 0.55% is drawn from Atkeson and Burstein (2010), they ﬁnd that this value
is consistent with that rate for large ﬁrms in the U.S. data. The annual interest rate (the annual
discount rate as well) assumes a value of 5% from Atkeson and Burstein (2010). The value of
intermediate goods elasticity of substitution assumes ρ = 5. Acemoglu et al. (2011) uses a value of
ε = 3 for the output production elasticity of substitution. Their model assumes that the production
process employs dirty and clean goods as inputs. While, we consider the same value of ε = 3 for the
elasticity of substitution between aggregate clean and dirty goods from the consumption aspect.
The productivity distribution G is parameterized such that all ﬁrms enter with a common
productivity of ϕ = 0, a discrete productivity shock assumes ∆ϕ = 0.25. As in Atkeson and
Burstein (2010), the process innovation cost function adopts a form of c(q) = ebq, where b governs
the curvature of this function. This curvature parameter also represents the elasticity of innovation,
the higher value of b, the more inelastic the process innovation decision is. In the baseline, we
consider the same low value of b = 10 for both dirty and clean sectors, so that the reallocation of
process innovation is quite large if a trade cost changes. The last key parameter is the discount
rate, which adopts the Stern discount rate of λ = 0.014 per annum.
144 Numerical Results
In this section, we conduct two numerical experiments concerning the implications of a stringent
environmental policy and a scenario of trade cost diﬀerences. These computational exercises aim to
highlight their impacts on the process innovation, trade pattern, and productivity dynamics within
and between sectors. Calibration exercise along with an asymmetric steady-state equilibrium is
beyond the scope of the current version of this paper.
4.1 Stringent Environmental Policy
We consider a reduction in emission caps by 20% below the baseline value of E = 80. The transi-
tion dynamics is not accounted in the paper, we only show changes of the symmetric steady-state
equilibrium in response to a reduction in cap. Figure 1 depicts the implications of the stringent
environmental policy on prices, mass of entering ﬁrms, aggregate productivity, and aggregate pro-
duction/consumption. The horizontal axis from right to left describes a reduction in emission cap.
The solid line is for the clean sector, the red dash-dot line refers to the dirty sector. Numbers in
the vertical axis are not meaningful in the absolute value unless the model is well calibrated to
reﬂect the U.S. data.
The model in the aggregate level is in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. As
predicted in the Rybczynski theorem, a reduction in emission cap would decrease the aggregate
production of the emission-intensive sector (dirty sector); and increase the aggregate production of
the labor-intensive sector (clean sector).
The heterogeneous ﬁrm’s framework could shed lights on the policy implications in much
broader dimensions than the traditional trade model with homogeneous ﬁrms. As usual, permit
price is decreasing in emission cap level. A tougher environmental policy raises the permit price,
which in turn aﬀects all operating ﬁrms with diﬀerent magnitudes. As a consequence, the relatively
less productive dirty plants are driven out, since they are unable to earn enough revenues to cover
production costs. The surviving dirty plants charge higher prices for tradeable intermediate goods,
then put upward pressure on the aggregate price for dirty goods. The aggregate production in dirty
sector falls as both production costs keep rising and less productive plants shut down. However,
plants in the clean sector are exempt from the upward pressure on emission permits.
15Another advantage of using the heterogeneous ﬁrm model is to characterize the impacts on
the mass of entering ﬁrms and aggregate productivity across all operating domestic and foreign
intermediate ﬁrms, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. According to the recursive algorithm
described in the pervious section, changes other than ﬁxed production costs and trade costs have
no eﬀects on ﬁrm’s innovation decision, henceforth the steady-state distribution normalized by
entering ﬁrms.1 A reduction in emission cap in this particular framework would only aﬀect ﬁrm’s
productivity dynamics through its inﬂuence on the mass of entering ﬁrms. Thus, changes of the mass
of entering ﬁrms also reﬂect changes of the aggregate productivity indices. The ﬁercer competition
in the emission permit market requires potential new dirty plants to draw higher productivity,
illustrated by a falling mass of entering ﬁrms in the dirty sector. As expected, the aggregate
productivity of all operating ﬁrms in the dirty sector falls as the emission permit cap declines.
Likewise for the aggregate productivity indices for exporters and non-exporters, which are not
shown in Figure 1.
4.2 Trade Cost Diﬀerence
We are interested at a particular scenario in which trade variable costs diﬀer across sectors. Specif-
ically, intermediate inputs in the dirty sector are subject to relatively higher trade variable costs
than those in the clean sector. It illustrates a potential international trade agreement devoted to
the clean environment. For example, an additional carbon fee for all carbon related intermediate
inputs which are shipped across countries. Under this numerical scenario, around 20% more trade
variable cost are charged for all exported dirty intermediate inputs. Figure 2 illustrates the scatter
plots of the value function and process innovation against the productivity grid. The blue cross
marker indicates the clean sector, the red point marker refers to the dirty sector.
With a 20% diﬀerence of trade variable costs between sectors, as shown in the upper panel
of Figure 2, intermediate ﬁrms in the clean sector have higher values of operation as compared
to those in the dirty sector, and the gap of operation value between sector rises as productivity
increases. Such gap arises only from trade variable cost diﬀerences since pollution intensity varying
1The Bellman equation (16) only depends on initial guess of variable proﬁt, discount rate, and cost structures
including production, exporting and innovation process. As long as all these costs are measured in units of labor, price
system like permit price, wage rate or aggregate price would not come into play in solving this dynamic programming
problem by the value function iteration method. Thus, a changing permit price due to a reduction in emission permit
cap would have no impacts on the process innovation and value function due to this special modeling assumption.
16across sector does not come into eﬀect in solving ﬁrm’s dynamic programming problems. A higher
trade variable cost sets higher trade barriers on intermediate inputs produced in the dirty sector,
and make those dirty plant much harder to survive in the exporting market. Only those relatively
productive dirty plants could still choose to export, the rest of them have to serve only the domestic
market. This resource reallocation from the exporting market to the domestic one lowers the value
of exporting, hence the value of operation, which in turn discourages the process innovation among
the dirty plants. Standing in the contrast, a relatively lower trade variable cost on clean inputs
contributes to the exporting market for the clean plants. As a consequence, it increases the incentive
of engaging in the process innovation for the clean plants, especially for those exporting ones. Trade
cost diﬀerences encourage the process innovation in the clean sector, but discourage that in the
dirty one, as captured in the lower panel of Figure 2.
Table 2 and 3 list simulation results about key variables in this system for two scenarios diﬀering
in trade variable costs. In the baseline scenario showed in Table 2, the ﬁxed trade cost is assumed
to be equal cross two sectors at a value of 0.30, while the trade cost adjusted term (τ1−ρ) in the
dirty sector is changed into 0.15, which implies an increase in the trade variable cost in the dirty
sector as in Table 3.2
In the baseline scenario, there are approximately 78% ﬁrms in both sectors involving in the
exporting activities and the average R&D rate in both sectors is around 43%. The equalities
between two sectors can be attributed to the speciﬁc model setup and algorithm we used to solve
the systematic steady-state ﬁrm distribution.3 Since the dirty ﬁrms bear some carbon fees due
to the emission cap, the price for ﬁnal dirty output is a little bit higher than the price of clean
ﬁnal output. Due to this exact reason, the mass of entering ﬁrms, the labor utilized in the clear
sector (both for production and ﬁrm built-up), the total production of clear ﬁnal output and the
aggregate productivity (total productivity, domestic productivity and exporting productivity) in
the clean sector are all larger than the counterparts in the dirty sector.
When the trade cost in the dirty sector increases, the portion of exporting ﬁrms in the dirty sec-
tor drops dramatically from 78% to barely 15%, an almost 80% drop. At the same time, the average
2The economic system is not calibrated to any real economy and the simulated policy change is not to mimic any
real policy proposals, thus the results should be thought as a qualitative analysis rather than a quantitative analysis.
In the future work, we would like to use the U.S. data to calibrate the model and provide a quantitative analysis on
the related policy.
3The reason is similar to the one discussed in aforementioned session.
17R&D rate decreases to 38% (an 11 percent drop from the baseline rate). These decreases come from
the fact that the increase in trade cost discourages the exporting activities at all productivity level
and lowers down the value of ﬁrms at all productivity levels, which in turn leads to less export-
ing ﬁrms and lower R&D activities. The prices for ﬁnal goods, aggregate production, aggregation
production labor and aggregate labor in both sectors do not change signiﬁcantly compared with
the baseline scenario. However, the mass of entering ﬁrms in the dirty sector increases up to 3.38
from 1.48. This contrast implies that the relatively high productive exporting ﬁrms are replaced
by the relatively low productive domestic ﬁrms, since high productive ﬁrms need more labor than
low productive ones, a big mass of low productive ﬁrms is needed to support the same amount of
production labor in the dirty sector. This change in landscape of ﬁrms in the dirty sector is also
reﬂected by the aggregate productivity. Although the aggregate productivity changes slightly in
both sectors, there are big diﬀerences in the allocation between aggregate domestic productivity
and aggregate exporting productivity. Compared with the baseline distribution, the aggregate do-
mestic productivity in the dirty sector increases from 5.199 to 24.136, while at the same time the
aggregate exporting productivity drops from 25.640 to 4.275. The increase of trade cost in the dirty
sector leads to signiﬁcant changes in the distribution of ﬁrms between the domestic and exporting
ﬁrms, and modest changes in the production of ﬁnal good in both sectors.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the basic framework in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) into a two-sector model
with environmental constraints. Two sectors, clean and dirty, employ a continuum of tradeable
intermediate inputs produced from either home intermediate ﬁrms or foreign ones to create the
non-tradable ﬁnal outputs, labeled as clean and dirty good, respectively. Sectors diﬀer in the sector-
speciﬁc pollution intensity. Intermediate ﬁrms must purchase the equivalent amount of emission
permits from their home country’s government to emit pollutants. Intermediate ﬁrms with the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity bears four diﬀerent types of costs, i.e. ﬁxed entry cost, ﬁxed operation
cost, exporting cost including both ﬁxed costs and iceberg form of variable costs, and the process
innovation costs.
We perform several numerical simulations to highlight the eﬀects of a stringent environmental
18policy and trade cost diﬀerences on the process innovation, trade pattern, mass of entering ﬁrms,
and aggregate productivity indices. As expected, a symmetric reduction in emission permit cap
raises the mass of entering ﬁrms in the clean sector, but lower the mass of entering ﬁrms in the dirty
sector. There exists resource reallocation between sectors, since dirty plants become much more
diﬃcult to survive under the high pressure of emission permit price than clean plants. Consequently,
the aggregate productivity across all domestic and exporting ﬁrms within the dirty sector drops,
but that index within the clean sector rises. Another numerical experiment concerns the impacts of
trade variable cost diﬀerences across sector. A lower trade variable cost on the clean intermediate
inputs contributes to R&D activities for all clean ﬁrms, especially for those productive ones; On
the contrary, a higher trade variable cost on the dirty intermediate inputs discourages the dirty
ﬁrms to engage in the process innovation.
The current version of this paper is absence of an accurate calibration along with an asymmet-
ric steady-state equilibrium in which countries are diﬀerent in terms of endowments, sector-speciﬁc
technology, etc. In the future research agenda, we would perform several more numerical simula-
tions regarding an asymmetric stringent environmental policy or trade liberalization. These policy
changes occur in the way of either an unilateral reduction in emission cap or trade cost on clean
good.
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Fixed production costs fc = fd = 0.1 AB(2010)1 , BRS(2007)2
Sunk entry costs fe
c = fe
d = 1 AB(2010)
Fixed exporting costs fx
c = fx
d = 0.13 AB(2010), BRS(2007)
Variable exporting costs τc = τd = 1.3 AB(2010)
Industry factor intensities βc = 0, βd = 0.6 assumed
Factor endowments L = 100, E = 80 assumed
Elasticity of process innovation bc = bd = 10 AB(2010)
Productivity jump ∆ϕ = 0.25 AB(2010)
Exit rates δ = 0.0055 AB(2010)
Input elasticity of substitution ρ = 5 AB(2010)
Output elasticity of substitution ε = 3 Acemoglu et al.(2011)
Discount rate λ = 0.014 Stern(2006)
1 Atkeson and Burstein, 2010
2 Bernard, Redding, and Schoot, 2007
22Figure 1: The Implication of a Tougher Environmental Policy
23Figure 2: Eﬀects of Trade Variable Cost Diﬀerences across Sector
24Table 2: Selected Steady-State Equilibrium Variables in Baseline
variable clean dirty
Trade variable cost τ1−ρ 0.30 0.30
Export share 0.784 0.784
Average process innovation q 0.429 0.429
Constant on variable proﬁts πv 0.434 0.434
Aggregate price P 0.582 0.635
Aggregate production Y 137.154 105.386
Aggregate production labor Lp 55.701 18.691
Aggregate Labor L 69.627 30.374
Mass of entering ﬁrms Me 1.766 1.482
Aggregate productivity ˜ ϕ 38.760 30.839
Aggregate domestic productivity ¯ ϕd,1 6.197 5.199
Aggregate exporting productivity ¯ ϕx,2 30.563 25.640
1 ¯ ϕd ≡ Me
j ˜ ϕd
j
2 ¯ ϕx ≡ Me




Table 3: Eﬀects of Trade Variable Cost Diﬀerences across Sector
variable clean dirty
Trade variable cost τ1−ρ 0.30 0.15
Export share 0.831 0.150
Average process innovation q 0.429 0.380
Constant on variable proﬁts πv 0.425 0.443
Aggregate price P 0.567 0.624
Aggregate production Y 136.833 102.820
Aggregate production labor Lp 55.952 18.498
Aggregate Labor L 69.502 30.498
Mass of entering ﬁrms Me 1.718 3.378
Aggregate productivity ˜ ϕ 35.768 28.410
Aggregate domestic productivity ¯ ϕd,1 6.030 24.136
Aggregate exporting productivity ¯ ϕx,2 29.739 4.275
1 ¯ ϕd ≡ Me
j ˜ ϕd
j
2 ¯ ϕx ≡ Me
j (1 + τ
1−ρ
j ˜ ϕx
j)
25